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Abstract 
Official (government-to-government) lending is much larger than commonly known, often 
surpassing total private cross-border capital flows, especially during disasters such as wars, 
financial crises and natural catastrophes. We assemble the first comprehensive long-run 
dataset of official international lending, covering 230,000 loans, grants and guarantees 
extended by governments, central banks, and multilateral institutions in the period 1790-2015. 
Historically, wars have been the main catalyst of government-to-government transfers. The 
scale of official credits granted in and around WW1 and WW2 was particularly large, easily 
surpassing the scale of total international bailout lending after the 2008 crash. During 
peacetime, development finance and financial crises are the main drivers of official cross-
border finance, with official flows often stepping in when private flows retrench. In line with 
the predictions of recent theoretical contributions, we find that official lending increases with 
the degree of economic integration. In crises and disasters, governments help those countries 
to which they have greater trade and banking exposure, hoping to reduce the collateral damage 
to their own economies. Since the 2000s, official finance has made a sharp comeback, largely 
due to the rise of China as an international creditor and the return of central bank cross-border 
lending in times of stress, this time in the form of swap lines.  
JEL: E42, F33, F34, F35, F36, G01, G20, N1, N2 
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 The world of official (bilateral and multilateral) lending remains largely unexplored in the 
academic literature, despite the scale and relevance of this type of cross-border flows. Most studies 
focus on a single government or institution, such as US lending as part of the Marshall Plan or IMF 
bailouts during the Asian Crisis. Compared to the vast literature on private cross-border capital flows, 
research on official international financial flows has been limited by a lack of systematic data. Existing 
datasets on official debt and inter-governmental lending typically have a narrow focus (e.g. on 
development aid, concessionary lending) or they start only in the 1970s. 
 We collect lending data by 134 creditor countries and 50 international and regional financial 
organizations across 200 years, building on hundreds of sources, including international treaties, 
budget accounts, proprietary lending data by the World Bank, and archival material. In total, we 
identify more than 230,000 official loans, grants and guarantees from 1790 to 2015, with total 
commitments amounting to more than 15 trillion US Dollars (in constant 2015 terms). Using this data, 
we document the characteristics of official capital flows, link them to the occurrence of disasters 
(wars, financial crises and natural disasters), and study their determinants with a gravity model of 
bilateral lending since the early 19th century. Our main findings can be summarized as follows.  
 Official lending by governments, central banks, and multilateral institutions is larger than 
commonly known. Indeed, over the past two centuries, official creditors have played a major role in 
international finance. Since 1800, official capital flows have repeatedly exceeded private cross-border 
flows. This is especially true during times of war, financial crises, or other disasters, when private 
flows decline and official actors become the chief international lenders.  
  The biggest surges in official lending occurred during major wars, in particular in WW1, 
WW2 and the Napoleonic wars. The amounts lent during these global conflicts were much larger than 
the loans made during global financial crises or major natural disasters. This adds perspective to 
modern debates on the international financial system, as there is a tendency to think of official finance 
as a complementary type of capital flows in the context of development aid and crisis bailouts. But this 
view reflects the fact that much of the world has enjoyed 70 years of peace. Global wars have been the 
most disruptive force in international finance. 
 In peacetime, the main driver of official international lending was and continues to be 
financial crises. We show that cross-border rescue lending during banking panics and currency crises 
has a long history, occurring repeatedly during the 19th and early 20th century, well before the creation 
of the IMF. The rescue loans extended in historical crises were substantial, e.g. in the crises of 1861 or 
1890, but they were granted ad hoc and to bridge short-term liquidity problems. In contrast, since 
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WW2, financial crisis lending has become much more institutionalized and “serial” bailouts to highly 
indebted countries have become more common. This is partly the result of the rise of international and 
regional financial institutions, in particular the IMF and the World Bank. Lending by these multilateral 
creditors overtook total bilateral lending for the first time in the 1970s.  
 By comparing our novel data on official flows with previously assembled long-run data on 
private international capital flows by Reinhart, Reinhart and Trebesch (2019) we show that both series 
are negatively correlated. Official capital flows are highest when private capital flows dry out. During 
wartime, private investors usually face widespread capital controls, while governments lend at record 
pace internationally. Furthermore, the data show that official creditors were the “only game in town” 
during the Bretton Woods era in the 1950s and 1960s, while private cross-border capital flows were 
scarce and heavily curtailed. An expanded official role is also evident during the height of the Great 
Depression in the 1930s and during the 2008 global financial crisis and its aftermath on periphery 
Europe, when central bank and sovereign lending spiked, while private capital outflows reversed.  
 It is not widely appreciated that we witnessed a comeback of official lending in the past two 
decades. China’s rise as an international creditor has been underestimated due to a lack of data and 
transparency. We document how China has become one of the most important official creditors 
worldwide, as almost all of its foreign lending is extended by the government and its state-owned 
banks (see also Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch 2019). China’s official lending boom is part of a more 
general rise of new creditor powers, especially emerging markets such as Russia, India, Brazil or the 
Arab oil states, who have all become active official lenders in varying degrees. In addition, dozens of 
new official lending institutions were founded since WW2, including a range of regional development 
banks and regional financial arrangements in Asia, Africa and South America. The result has been a 
notable increase in “South-South” official sovereign lending. More generally, we find a much higher 
incidence of official loans in the current era. Today, most financial crises, natural catastrophes and 
wars are accompanied by official lending of some form. This was not the case historically. 
 Similarly, we are seeing a resurgence of official financing via central banks. During the 
financial crisis of 2008 the Federal Reserve Bank, the ECB and the Bank of Japan granted record 
amounts of “swap lines” via a network of standing credit lines that allow drawing overnight foreign 
currency loans (Bahaj and Reis 2019). These developments are reminiscent of the flourishing cross-
border central bank lending during the gold standard era pre-WW1 and in the interwar years. The 
newly resurrected and intensely used Federal Reserve swap lines during the COVID-19 pandemic are 
yet another example. 
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 On the determinants of official flows, our results are consistent with the predictions of 
recent theoretical contributions. Tirole (2015), Farhi and Tirole (2018) and Gourinchas, Martin and 
Messer (2019) all predict the scope of bilateral official lending and bailouts to increase with economic 
and financial integration. When the negative spillovers from a crisis country are potentially high, e.g., 
due to close bank and trade linkages, countries have an incentive to grant rescue loans to the 
government facing the crisis. In so doing, creditor governments aim to reduce the collateral damage to 
their own economy.  
 Until now, it was difficult to test these priors systematically, due to data limitations. We 
connect the models and narratives in this literature to our new database. We estimate an augmented 
gravity model of bilateral official loans worldwide and across crises and disasters of the past two 
centuries (including more than 1700 dyads). We find that bilateral trade and bilateral bank exposure 
are indeed a key predictor of official lending flows in crisis times. Across all eras, countries were most 
willing to help others when private agents had significant economic or financial exposure in the 
recipient countries. The prevailing interpretation is that foreign official lending is a function of 
economic and political self-interest, rather than of altruism or more general “country solidarity”. At 
the same time, official flows seem to be impeded by informational asymmetries, as the likelihood of 
rescue lending decreases significantly with higher geographic and cultural distance. 
 Our paper adds a significant missing piece to the literature on capital flows and the 
international monetary system. Research in this broad topic has almost exclusively focused on private 
capital flows (see, for example, Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart 1993, Stone 1999, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2000, Obstfeld and Taylor 2004, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007, Bruno and Shin 2015, 
Gourinchas and Jeanne 2013, Rey 2015, Stallings 1987 and Reinhart, Reinhart and Trebesch 2016). In 
contrast, there is only very little research on official capital flows (among the few exceptions is the 
pioneering work on official finance by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych 2014, as well as some 
of our own work in Reinhart and Trebesch 2016 and Schlegl, Trebesch and Wright 2019). Given the 
size of official capital flows, both in the past and most recently, omitting official lending distorts the 
picture on the size and dynamics of international capital flows. The omission is most problematic 
during natural disasters, economic crises and war.  
 Our analysis also contributes to the literature on macroeconomic disasters (e.g. Barro 2006, 
Barro and Ursúa 2008, Gabaix 2012) and on the economics of international wars (e.g. Martin, Mayer 
and Thoenig 2005, Glick and Taylor 2010), by combining our dataset on official flows with data on 
military conflicts, natural disasters and financial crises. Not unlike the literature on capital flows, 
economic research on disasters and wars has focused primarily on the implications for private capital 
markets and trade. We show that over the past 200 years, official lending repeatedly reached record 
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heights during some macroeconomic disasters and all global wars, with large potential consequences 
for output, trade and asset markets alike (these effects remain largely unexplored). 
 More generally, our dataset allows us to address fundamental questions of international 
cooperation in a new way. Why do countries cooperate financially and what are the outcomes? 
Existing work on economic cooperation between sovereign states mainly focuses on cooperation in the 
realms of fiscal policy, exchange rate policy, or banking regulation (e.g. the seminal work of 
Kindleberger 1986, Eichengreen 1992, or James 1996). But, until now, there have been almost no 
systematic empirical analyses on the determinants of financial cooperation via sovereign-to-sovereign 
and central-bank-to-central-bank lending in the past and present, which is the focus here.  
 Another strand of related literature focuses on financial crises and sovereign debt problems. 
Countless papers have explored the pricing of privately held sovereign bonds and the determinants and 
effects of default by sovereign borrowers (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, Panizza et al. 2009, Aguiar 
and Amador 2014 or Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch 2019 for overviews). In contrast, there has been 
very little work on lending by sovereigns. The history of official debt has long been overlooked in this 
research area, except for a body of work on IMF and World Bank lending, which, as we document, 
only became large in the 1970s and today accounts for a third of total official lending. We contribute 
to the literature on financial crises by conducting the first systematic long-run study on international 
official rescue lending during debt, currency and banking crises in both advanced and developing 
countries.    
 We thereby considerably expand the existing narratives and data collections on country 
bailouts, e.g. by Kindleberger (2006), Bordo and Schwartz (1998), Roubini and Setser (2004), Barkbu, 
Eichengreen and Mody (2012), Tooze (2015) or Corsetti, Erce and Uy (2017, 2018). Our data show 
that crisis lending has evolved from occasional, ad-hoc rescue loans by allied states to a global 
financial safety net with dozens of institutions. Besides covering the incidence, origin, and amounts of 
official lending, we also gathered information on the interest rates and repayment terms, as well as on 
the political conditions of official support. This data resource will allow further analyses on the 
determinants, design, and consequences of cross-border bailouts and will help to inform the theoretical 
literature on international crises (see above, as well as Summers 2000, Bordo et al. 2001 and 
Lorenzoni 2014, for overviews).2 By exploring political drivers of bilateral rescue lending we also add 
to existing work on the political economy of bailouts (Brown and Dinc 2005, Schneider and Tobin 
2020). 
 
2 A small theoretical literature specifically studies sovereign bailouts across borders, e.g. Corsetti, Guimaraes 
and Roubini 2006, Morris and Shin 2006, Dellas and Niepelt 2016, Fink and Scholl 2016, Corsetti, Erce and Uy 
2018, Roch and Uhlig 2018, as well as the references cited above: Tirole (2015), Farhi and Tirole (2018) 
Gourinchas, Martin and Messer (2019).  
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 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides information on who 
lends, tracking official creditors and institutions since 1790. This section also describes our coding and 
data sources. Section 3 presents our new database and provides a panoramic view on salient features of 
official sovereign lending across two centuries: We identify the main creditors and the (de jure) 
purposes of official lending over time and document the time profile of official transfers. We also 
examine the correlation of official flows with private international capital flows. In Section 4, we turn 
to official lending in times of crises and disasters. To do so we compile a new database on the 
occurrence of different disasters that tracks financial crises, military conflict and severe natural 
disasters. In Section 5 we explore the determinants of official lending by estimating an augmented 
gravity model of bilateral rescue loans. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Measuring official sovereign lending: methodology and sources 
 The main challenge to the study of official international lending is the lack of systematic 
and encompassing data, with most available data not going back any further than the mid-1970s. We 
therefore embark on a large-scale data collection effort with the objective of constructing the first 
long-run database on official flows over two centuries. This section offers a sketch of the main 
elements of our database, while Appendix III provides a much more detailed overview on our sources 
and coding approach. 
 We define official international lending (conventional definition) as all loans, grants and 
guarantees extended by a sovereign, supra-sovereign or sub-sovereign creditor entity to a foreign 
sovereign or non-sovereign debtor. By this definition, official creditors include both bilateral and 
multilateral institutions, as well as sub-sovereign creditors such as a state-owned export and 
development banks. Given the relative scarcity of discussion on official lending in history, the next 
subsection provides a brief background on the universe of official creditor institutions over the past 
200 years. This sets the stage for the subsequent description of our data sources.  
2.1 Official creditors and institutions since 1790 
 Figure 1 provides a stylized representation of the evolution of the official creditor universe, 
distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral institutions. Throughout the 19th century and up until 
the 1920s, official international loans were exclusively extended by bilateral creditors, namely by the 
treasuries, foreign and colonial offices and war ministries of nations, as well as by national central 
banks. These institutions were not specialized on providing foreign loans, but took up the task when 
special circumstances required them to do so, very often under considerable political controversy.   
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Figure 1. The universe of official sovereign creditor institutions 1790 – 2015 
 
 
Sources: Official international lending database and Cogan et al. (2016). 
 
 
 The practice of official sovereign lending across borders changed profoundly with the onset 
of World War I. European sovereigns established a new type of official creditor institution: state-
owned export banks that guaranteed private trade credits and directly extended buyer credits to foreign 
sovereigns, in particular to the Soviet Union that had lost access to private capital markets (Margold, 
1934). In addition, the League of Nations, founded in 1920, started to cooperate with national 
treasuries to mobilize rescue loans for crisis countries in need, especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe where governments tried to stabilize their currencies after the war (Flores Zendejas and 
Decorzant, 2016). In doing so, they were supported by increasingly active central banks, which 
extended record amounts of rescue loans to other central banks facing capital and gold outflows in an 
effort to support the interwar gold standard. This era of central bank cooperation peaked during the 
crisis of 1931 and quickly receded afterwards. Guided by the newly founded Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), central banks mobilized significant emergency credits to Central Europe and 
Britain to stem the turmoil caused by the retrenchment of private flows, with limited success 
(Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2015). 
 The crisis of 1931 and its aftermath mark a turning point in the development of official 
international lending. The crisis highlighted the volatile nature of private capital flows and led leading 
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(Nurkse, 1944). During the course of the 1930s, the United States joined European states in extending 
official loans to states with balance-of-payments problems, in particular through the US Export-Import 
Bank and the US Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund, which was established in 1934.  
 The lessons learned during these operations turned out to have great effect on the design of 
the post-World War II Bretton Woods System (Bordo and Schwartz, 2001). In 1944, the IMF was 
founded with the aim of providing short-term official funds to countries with temporary balance-of-
payments problems, alongside with the World Bank that was intended to provide long-term 
development and reconstruction funds. However, official lending during the post-war decades 
continued to be dominated by bilateral creditors. The US, in particular, engaged in large scale lending, 
e.g. via the Marshall Plan and EXIM Bank funds. Also the Soviet Union became an active official 
lender. Furthermore, outside the convertible dollar and sterling areas, sovereigns financed their current 
account deficits with the reciprocal extension of clearing credits. 
 Starting from the late 1950s, the practice of official lending began to gradually shift from 
bilateral to multilateral creditor institutions, driven by a remarkable increase in the number and variety 
of multilateral lending institutions. Regional development banks first emerged in the late 1950s with 
the establishment of the European Development Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank and 
have spread to all regions of the globe since. In parallel, new Regional Financial Arrangements 
(RFAs) were set up, typically focused on providing emergency funds during balance-of-payments 
crises of member states. Early examples include the European Monetary Agreement founded in 1958 
and the Central American Monetary Stabilization Fund of 1970. More recently, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) founded in 2012, is just one manifestations of this long-run trend towards regional 
rescue facilities (Scheubel and Stracca 2016). Beyond regional and multilateral arrangements, central 
bank swap lines have become an additional main source of official emergency finance. Starting with 
the defense of the Bretton Woods system in the 1960s, a network of bilateral swap lines has been in 
place that connects the major central banks of the world. More recently, these networks have been 
expanded in size and scope. They now include the central banks of main emerging markets and, driven 
by China’s central bank, also a growing number of developing countries.  
 Taken together, these institutional developments have transformed the practice of official 
sovereign lending from occasional instances of ad hoc cooperation between two states into a multi-




2.2 Main sources and scope of the database 
 Our new database compiles loans, grants and guarantees from the majority of these official 
creditors and several hundred primary and secondary sources that are described in detail in Appendix 
III. The resulting database spans official lending from 1790 to 2015 and covers more than 230,000 
loans, grants and guarantees extended by national agencies of up to 134 bilateral creditor countries and 
by 50 different international organizations (see Appendix III for a full list). Whenever available we 
collected data on the creditor and the borrower, both commitment and disbursement amounts, the 
purpose of the loan as well as the interest rates and repayment terms. In other cases, our data is more 
aggregate. At the minimum, however, our database contains creditor and borrower country as well as 
commitment amounts at the annual level allowing us to identify source and direction of official 
lending and thus the bilateral patterns of international official flows. We now sketch the main sources 
used in constructing the database.   
 International treaty series: Our main source for official lending during the 19th century and 
leading up to World War II are international treaty collections. In doing so, we make use of the fact 
that the conduct of foreign policy became increasingly formalized in the late 18th century, so that 
international loans between two states were now codified in inter-governmental treaties (Keene 2012). 
Our sources show that, over the course of the 150 years from 1790 to World War II, sovereigns 
negotiated thousands of bilateral treaties, in which they regulated their political and commercial 
interactions. To identify bilateral lending, we systematically search the available treaty collections and 
related databases for bilateral financial agreements that arrange the extension of loans and grants or 
that extend guarantees on privately issued international loans or bonds.  
 National budget accounts and parliamentary records: For the main bilateral creditor 
countries prior to World War II, we supplement the information obtained from international treaties 
with national budget accounts and parliamentary records. In the absence of specialized creditor 
entities, international official loans often required parliamentary approval and we can use these 
sources as important consistency check. Furthermore, they allow us to capture within-empire (country) 
transactions, e.g. lending to colonies, for which no inter-governmental treaties exist. More specifically, 
we comb through the national budgets and parliamentary records of the UK, France, Germany and the 
US starting in the early 19th century. 
 Reports and datasets from international organizations: Starting from the inter-war period, 
publications and data by international organizations become an additional, highly valuable source. We 
make extensive use of regular research reports on international capital flows by the League of Nations, 
the BIS, the IBRD, the UN, the OECD and the IADB. We also use a wide range of creditor specific 
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sources, such as recently declassified CIA reports on foreign lending by Sino-Soviet Bloc countries 
and the annual reports of a large number of bilateral and multilateral creditor institutions. Moreover, 
and most importantly, we supplement this hand-coded data with a comprehensive data-extract on 
bilateral lending from the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System (DRS), which was shared with us 
on a confidential basis. Specifically, the DRS records all bilateral lending transactions of all member 
states reporting to the World Bank, starting in the 1960s. For aid flows and grants, our main sources 
are the OECD's Creditor Reporting System and the database provided by AidData at William & Mary 
(Tierney et al., 2011). 
 Archival research (especially central bank archives): For a subgroup of official creditors no 
published reports of sufficient detail are available. This is particularly the case for central banks and 
the BIS. In these cases, we go through the archives of these institutions and collect data from original 
reports and documents. Appendix III provides details on this (ongoing) data collection process. 
 Secondary sources: Finally, we draw on the existing literature on international capital flows 
and international political relations. These sources, again listed in Appendix III, allow us to 
complement and cross-check our own data. 
Figure 2. Illustration of historical sources – international financial agreements and budget reports 
 
Note: This figure shows examples for the most common historical sources used to construct our database in the 
19th century. We show an extract from an international financial treaty (left panel) as well as from a national 




3. Official sovereign lending 1790 – 2015: A panoramic view 
 This section introduces our new database and gives a descriptive overview on the 
occurrence and magnitude of official sovereign lending from 1790 to 2015. We discuss the main 
creditors, recipients and purposes of official lending over time. 
Figure 3. Bilateral and multilateral official lending 1790 – 2015 
 
 
Note: The data includes commitments through grants, loans and guarantees, but excludes official portfolio 
investments and central bank lending (see below. The data is from the international official lending database that 
we construct (see Appendix III for details). 
 
 
 Figure 3 summarizes the ebbs and flows of inter-governmental lending, by showing annual 
gross commitments by bilateral and multilateral creditors since the French Revolution. All amounts 
are scaled by the GDP of the most important official creditor country. Specifically, we use UK GDP 
until the onset of the First World War (1914) and US GDP thereafter. While there are various 
alternative scaling options, the use of US and UK GDP offers comprehensive coverage.3 Official 
lending was dominated by bilateral creditors until the Second World War. With the foundation of the 
IMF and the World Bank Group, lending gradually shifted from bilateral to multilateral sources. 
 
3 The main conclusions of this section are not altered when using alternative series for scaling, e.g. world GDP. 
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During the 1970s, multilateral lending first overtook bilateral lending and has remained dominant 
since then. 
 To further distinguish by type of creditor, Figure 4 shows the share of total official lending 
since 1900 for (i) bilateral creditors, (ii) the IMF and the World Bank, and (iii) other multilateral 
creditors, in particular regional development banks and regional financial arrangements. It can be seen 
that the third category of “other” multilateral creditors is now more important than ever.  
 
Figure 4. Relative importance of multilateral and bilateral creditors over time
 
Note: Other multilateral creditors (yellow area) include different regional development banks and regional 
financial arrangements as well as loans issued under the auspices of the League of Nations (see appendix III.6 
for a full list). Bilateral creditors are represented by the blue area. All three series are smoothed by applying a 
five-year moving average. Source: international official lending database (see Appendix III). 
 
Within the group of bilateral creditors, the relative importance of individual countries varies 
markedly over time, reflecting long-run shifts in economic and political power. Up until the First 
World War, bilateral lending was dominated by the Great European Powers, in particular Great Britain 
and France. Over the course of the two World Wars and throughout the Cold War, the United States 
emerged as the world’s primary official creditor. In comparison, official lending by the Soviet-Sino 
bloc was small, although it increased until the 1980s. During the oil crises of the 1970s, oil exporting 
nations suddenly became a major source of official international lending. Since then, in particular after 
the end of the Cold War, the international landscape of bilateral lending has become more 
heterogeneous. In line with their growing share of world output and trade, emerging market countries 
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have established themselves as leading bilateral creditors. This development is driven by China, which 
has recently surpassed the US, the World Bank and the IMF as the world’s most important official 
creditor (see Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch 2019). 
 
Figure 5. Recipients of official sovereign lending 1790 - 2015 
 
Note: The data includes commitments through grants, loans and guarantees, but excludes official portfolio 
investments and central bank swap credit. Data is from the international official lending database (Appendix III).  
 
 Not just the creditors, but also the recipients of official flows have changed markedly over 
the course of the past 200 years. Today, official sovereign lending is often associated with rescue 
lending and aid to developing countries. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the bulk of official lending 
between 1960 and the 2000s went to developing countries. Before that, however, over a span of more 
than 150 years, advanced countries have been the main recipients of official loans, especially during 
times of global war. Also more recently, after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2010-12 Eurozone 
crisis, advanced countries received large-scale official lending, via regional and multilateral financial 
arrangements, as well as via central bank swap lines (see below). 
To provide a first overview on the motives of government-to-government and multilateral 
official lending over the past 200 years we distinguish between four categories of lending purposes – 
military assistance, economic development, humanitarian relief, and financial crisis rescues. The 
category of military assistance covers loans and grants extended for the pursuit of war, defense or 
procurement of military equipment. The category of economic development includes loans and grants 
13 
 
extended for the financing of projects in developing countries ranging from infrastructure investments 
to state-building activities. The category of humanitarian relief relates to financial assistance in 
response to natural disasters, e.g. grants to purchase basic necessities such as food. The fourth 
category, financial rescue loans, covers loans, grants and guarantees during currency, debt and banking 
crises, including balance-of-payment crises, as well as general budget support. 
 
Figure 6. The purpose of official sovereign lending 1790 - 2015 
 
Note: The data includes commitments through grants, loans and guarantees, but excludes official portfolio 
investments and central bank swap credit. Data is from the international official lending database (Appendix III).  
 
  
 Whenever possible, we rely on the original sources to distinguish between these purposes, 
although we are aware that the distinction is not always clear-cut and involves a number of judgement 
calls. One problem is that the officially declared purpose of a loan does not necessarily need to align 
with its de facto purpose. As an example, foreign currency loans for development projects are often 
provided during a financial crisis, in order to address a severe balance-of-payment problem. Moreover, 
we sometimes lack official information on the lending purpose so that we need to infer the purpose 
from events at the time. Despite these caveats and challenges, Figure 6 is helpful as a first descriptive 
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overview and to motivate our more systematic analysis of official lending during disasters in sections 
4 and 5.  
 Figures 3 and 6 illustrate that, during the 19th century and up to World War I official 
sovereign lending was heavily concentrated in times of major wars. Notable lending surges occurred 
during the French Revolutionary Wars, the Napoleonic Wars and the First Crimean War. In each case 
the Great European Powers provided substantial financial support to their allies by means of loans, 
guarantees and grants. Similarly, during the Latin American Wars of Independence the newly founded 
republics cooperated financially through the extension of loans and grants in an effort to win against 
Spain. With respect to financial crises, there were repeated instances of official rescue lending during 
banking panics, through reciprocal credits between central banks (see below and Eichengreen 1992, 
Bordo and Schwartz 1998). In contrast, there are only few cases of official lending during sovereign 
debt crises, e.g. the official guarantees on private bonds issued by Greece in 1832 and 1898. Sovereign 
defaults were more commonly left to market forces or solved through enforced adjustments in the 
form of super-sanctions (Mitchener and Weidenmier 2010, Tuncer 2015). Moreover, prior to World 
War I, we found few instances of official lending in response to natural disasters or famines and also 
official lending for development purposes was very limited throughout the 19th century, with the 
exception of transactions within empires, where grants and loans were occasionally used to build 
infrastructure and to contain the negative effects of military conflict, e.g. in Transvaal after the Second 
Boer War.  
 During the first half of the 20th century, the two World Wars stand out, leading to 
historically unprecedented levels of international assistance. Interestingly, however, the aftermaths of 
the two wars look very different. After World War I, official flows quickly dried up, with only modest 
lending for relief and reconstruction. In contrast, after 1945, official lending remained strong over the 
course of the entire Bretton Woods era. US bilateral loans, in particular, played a crucial role in the 
closing of the Dollar Gap and the reconstruction of Europe (mostly connected with the Marshall Plan). 
This period - from the break-down of the inter-war gold exchange standard in 1931 to the late 1960s - 
can be considered the heyday of official finance. With wide-spread capital controls on private flows 
and financial repression, official loans constituted the only feasible means of international capital 
transfers.  
 With the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and the steady rise in private capital 
mobility, the purpose of official lending changed again. There are increasing financial flows to finance 
domestic development and infrastructure projects in developing countries. These countries often lack 
access to international private capital markets, so that official lending in the form of aid is often the 
only source of foreign savings. Figure 6 shows that the scale of official flows for development finance 
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has remained remarkably stable over the past decades. In contrast, official flows to advanced and 
emerging economies are more volatile, driven mainly by economic and political crises. Indeed, it is the 
incidence of major financial crises that explain most of the recent spikes in bilateral and multilateral 
commitments, including the official rescue packages extended during the Oil Crises, the emerging 
markets crises of the 1980s and 1990s and most recently during the Great Financial and the subsequent 
Euro Debt Crisis.  
 Over the past two decades, and especially after 2008 we are witnessing a comeback of 
official finance, thus reversing a decade-long trend of gradual decline. Besides the large-scale 
international bailouts during the financial crisis, it is the rise of China and of other emerging donor 
countries such as India or resource-rich Arab countries that has contributed to a resurgence of bilateral 
lending. Today, bilateral lending, in particular from China, constitutes a prime source of external 
financing for dozens of low-income and emerging countries (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch 2019).  
 Another important reason for the comeback in official finance is the re-emergence of cross-
border central bank lending. Figure 7 adds credits and swap lines extended between central banks to 
the total volume of official loan commitments (thus combining Figure 3 and Figure 8 below). The 
graph reveals that international central bank credits have been quantitatively important both today and 
in history, with credits exceeding 2% of UK or US GDP in different spells of the past 200 years. 
 During the 19th century, there were repeated episodes with sizeable central bank lending, 
including the Panic of 1861, the Baring Crisis in 1890 and the Panic of 1907. In the 20th century, 
international central bank lending intensified during the interwar years. In the 1920s, for example, 
consortia of central banks agreed to extend reciprocal credits so as to help each other return to gold 
(Meyer 1970). In 1931, central bank lending reached a historic peak, with total credits exceeding 3% 
of US GDP. Yet, these rescue credits, mainly extended to Austria, Hungary, Germany and Britain, did 
not suffice to prevent the inter-war gold standard from collapsing (Accominotti and Eichengreen, 
2015). Beyond these rescue operations, the US Federal Reserve granted a series of short-term credits 
to Latin American countries facing balance-of-payments difficulties during the 1930s.  
 In the decades following World War II, central bank lending across borders played a crucial 
role in the defense of the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates during the 1960s and 
involved sizeable drawings on the Federal Reserve’s swap line network, with support flowing to the 





Figure 7. Adding central bank lending: short-term credits and swaps across borders 
 
Note: This graph adds data on central bank lending (see Figure 8) to the data on bilateral and multilateral official 
loans (from Figure 3). The central bank lending data includes short-term credits to foreign central banks, as well 
as bilateral swap line drawings (after WW2). See Figure 8 for details.  
  
Figure 8. Central bank lending across borders, 1815-2015 
 
Note: The graph shows a time series on our ongoing data collection on cross-border central bank lending since 
1815. The data includes central bank short-term credits to foreign central banks as well as bilateral swap line 
drawings (after WW2), shown in percent of UK GDP until 1914 and in percent of US GDP thereafter.  
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 Figure 8 above illustrates the re-emergence of large-scale international central bank lending 
during the 2008 crash, at a scale not seen since the interwar years. This time lending took the form of 
large-scale liquidity swap line drawings, rather than short-term credits like in the 1920s and 30s 
(Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor 2009, Tooze 2018, Bahaj and Reis 2019). Figure 9 adds to this by 
focusing on the US Federal Reserve swap line network, with total drawings shown in USD since 2007. 
At the peak of the financial crisis in end-2008, total cross-border swap line drawings by foreign central 
banks exceeded 500 billion USD, a whopping amount that corresponds to more than 3% of USD GDP 
of 2008. This is not far from the latest spike in US swap line drawings since the start of the COVID-19 
crisis. As of May 2020, 400 billion USD have been drawn, corresponding to more than 2% of US 
GDP of 2019. 
Figure 9. US Federal Reserve liquidity swaps extended to foreign central banks (in billion USD) 
 
 
Note: The data includes total drawings on the US liquidity swap network by foreign central banks on a 
weekly basis. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
 
 To conclude our panoramic overview, we now compare the ebbs and flows of official 
international lending with those of private capital flows. Figure 10 combines our series of official 
lending commitments since 1790 with the long-run series of private cross-border capital flows from 
Reinhart, Reinhart and Trebesch (2016, 2019), which starts in 1815 and builds on their newly 
constructed “Global Capital Flow Database”. More specifically, the series on private capital flows 
splices newly collected data on primary bond issuances in international markets (gross flows, until 
WW1) with data on net capital flows to 63 capital importing countries, building on newly collected 
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country data on current accounts and gold and foreign exchange reserves since the interwar years 
(global net capital flows, after WW1).  
 Figure 10 sheds new light on the history of the International Monetary System. A first take 
away is that the magnitudes of official and private cross-border capital flows are comparable in size, 
with international flows exceeding private flows in several historical spells. This finding is confirmed 
when comparing gross private and official flows, i.e. by merging our newly assembled official lending 
data with data on total sovereign bond issuance in international markets from Meyer, Reinhart and 
Trebesch (2019) or End, Mariko and Miryugin (2019). In particular during periods of stress, official 
international lending to sovereigns tends to be higher than total private sovereign lending by 
international banks and bondholders.  
 
Figure 10. Official sovereign lending and private capital flows 1790 - 2015 
 
Note: The grey shaded era shows official international lending, including bilateral and multilateral 
commitments through grants, loans and guarantees, as well as central bank lending and swap line 
drawings. The red bold line shows the spliced series on private, cross-border capital flows from Reinhart, 
Reinhart and Trebesch (2016, 2019). Both series are scaled by main creditor GDP.  
 
 
The second main take away from Figure 10 is that official and private flows are negatively 
correlated. When private capital flows retrench, official international flows often step in, with major 
multilateral and bilateral lending surges during WW1 and WW2 as well as in major financial crises, 
most visibly during the Great Depression (after 1930) and after the 2008 crash, but also in more 
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idiosyncratic, regional crises such as during the 1960s or the European exchange rate crisis of the early 
1990s. 
4. Official lending in wars, financial crises and natural disasters 
In this section, we match our data on official sovereign lending with data on the occurrence of 
disasters, more specifically of wars, financial crises and severe natural catastrophes such as 
earthquakes. This allows us to study the international response to crises across different eras of the 
international financial system. We begin by compiling a comprehensive database on disaster and crisis 
events in the past 200 years and then match this with our novel dataset on official lending. 
4.1 Identifying disasters and defining crisis events  
 To identify financial crises, military conflicts and severe natural disasters, we make use of a 
variety of sources. This section provides an overview, while details are described in Appendix I. Our 
approach focuses on actual disaster dates and events, in contrast to a related macroeconomic literature 
that defines “macroeconomic disasters” as drops in consumption or GDP beyond a specific threshold 
(see Barro and Ursúa 2010). The advantage of using event data is that it allows for much broader 
geographic and time coverage, given that long-run consumption and GDP data is only available for 
advanced countries and a few select emerging market countries. Furthermore, event-based data allows 
for a more granular analysis, e.g. by differentiating between different types of shocks and disasters. 
 To identify financial crises, we rely on the data of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and the data 
update by Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2019). We consider banking, currency and external 
sovereign debt crises and follow the crisis definitions brought forward by Reinhart and Rogoff (see 
Appendix I). 
Our definition of wars follows the Correlates of War (CoW) project, namely a sustained 
combat, involving organized armed forces and resulting in a minimum of 1000 battle-related fatalities 
over the course of a 12 months period (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The CoW data collection 
distinguishes inter-state and intra-state conflict, both of which are included as disaster events here. 
International or inter-state conflicts are defined as wars between two or more territorial states that are 
members of the international state system. Intra-state (or civil) wars are defined by sustained military 
combat within a state and with active participation of the national government. In the CoW database, 
war begins with the onset of sustained military combat, irrespective of a formal declaration of war. 
 Measuring natural disasters and the resulting damages and casualties over 200 years is 
challenging. To build a long-run dataset we draw on a large number of sources. First and most 
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importantly, we draw on the EM-DAT International Disaster Database, which contains information on 
several thousand natural disasters around the globe since 1900, including geophysical (earthquakes 
and volcano eruptions), meteorological (extreme temperatures and storms), hydrological (floods and 
landslides), climatological (droughts, famines and wildfires) and biological disasters such as 
epidemics. To expand the data coverage to the 19th century, we supplement this source with 
information from the National Center for Environmental Information, which lists events of 
earthquakes, volcano eruptions, floods, tsunamis, and storms going back until 1800. In addition, we 
make use of multiple historical and country studies on famines and epidemics during the 19th century, 
as listed in Appendix I.  
 Table 1. Number of disaster events in different eras: 1800-2015
 
Sources: See text and Appendix I for details.  
 
The resulting dataset identifies several thousand natural disasters since 1800. Given our focus on 
disasters that warrant the provision of international financial assistance, we focus only on the most 
severe events. To do so, we match our list of natural disasters with population data from Mitchell 
(2013) and include only those natural disasters that result in casualties of at least 0.1 percent of the 
population. This yields 108 severe natural disaster events over the course of the past 200 years. While 
the timing of the disaster event is straight-forward with respect to earthquakes, floods or hurricanes, it 
can be difficult to accurately measure the duration of famines and epidemics. For these episodes, we 
consider the initial two years of the outbreak.  
Table 1 summarizes the number of disasters and their frequency across different eras. Figure 
11 also plots the incidence of disasters but takes a different perspective. It shows the share of 
independent countries that experience war, enter financial crises or suffer from severe natural disasters 
in any given year since 1800 based on our sample. Figure 11 reveals that the time-variation in the 
Financial crises 254 235 164 416
Severe natural
disasters




1800 - 1913 1914 - 1945 1946 - 1973 1973 - 2015
Long 19th Century Inter-War Period Bretton Woods
44 28 20 16
455 333 288 586
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number of disasters is primarily driven by the waves of financial crises and military conflict that are 
spatially correlated. In contrast, the occurrence of severe natural disaster events is less cyclical and 
fairly constant over time.  
Figure 11. Incidence of wars, crises and natural disasters 1800 – 2010  
 
Note: Share of countries experiencing disasters. See text and Appendix I for details. 
4.2 The international response to disasters – descriptives and case narratives 
In this section we merge our new data on official lending with the above described data on 
disaster events in order to analyze the international response to disasters over the past 200 years. We 
begin by presenting case narratives for each type of disaster and then turn to a more systematic 
assessment of the incidence of rescue lending across time. 
The following tables show selected cases of international financial rescues in severe natural 
disasters (Table 2), during military conflicts (Table 3) and during financial crises (Table 4). For each 
of the listed episodes, the tables show the most important recipients, the main official creditors and the 
magnitude of assistance provided. The cases illustrate that international official lending played an 




Table 2. Natural disasters and their official international response: selected cases, 1800-2015 






(in real 2015 USD 
 and as % of recipient 










$ 27 mn 
Caracas Earthquake 1812 Venezuela USA $ 1 mn 
Hurricane 1836 Dominica United Kingdom $ 1.2 mn 
Volcano eruption, 
earthquakes 
1843 Antigua, Montserrat United Kingdom $ 21 mn 





$ 14 mn 
Famine 1913 Albania United Kingdom $ 0.2 mn 
Famines 
(following WWI) 
1919 – 1923 Europe USA, UK, 
France, Norway 
$ 12 bn 
Jericho Earthquake 1927 Transjordan United Kingdom $ 1.4 mn 
Flood 1949 Guatemala US, Cuba 
$ 46 mn 
7 % of imports 
Valdivia 
Earthquake 
1960 Chile IMF, IBRD, US 
$ 6 bn 
12 % of GDP 
230 % of imports 
Famine 1983 – 1985 Ethiopia UN, IDA, Soviet 
Union 
$ 4 bn 
27 % of GDP 
260 % of imports 
Cyclone 1991 Bangladesh 
UN, IDA, G-7 
countries 
$ 4.3 bn 
8 % of GDP 
68 % of imports 
Tsunami 2004 Sri Lanka 
UN, IDA, Japan, 
China 
$ 3 bn 
14 % of GDP 
45 % of imports 
Earthquake 2010 Haiti 
UN, IADB, US, 
France 
$ 6 bn 
90 % of GDP 
200 % of imports 
 
Note: This table shows the scale of official rescue lending in selected severe natural disasters of the past 200 
years. The size of official assistance is given in real 2015 US Dollars. Whenever data availability permits, we 













(in real 2015 USD  
and as % of recipient 




1792  - 1802 Austria, Prussia United Kingdom $ 2 bn 




  United Kingdom $ 5 bn  




$ 950 mn  
1st Sino-Japanese 
War 
1895 China France, Russia 
$ 2.1 bn 
0.5 % of GDP 
66 % of imports 
World War I 1914 - 1918 UK, France, Russia US, UK, France $ 475 bn  
2nd Sino-Japanese 
War 
1935 - 1938 China 
USA, Soviet 
Union 
$ 2.7 bn  
22 % of GDP 







$ 12.5 bn 
11 % of GDP 
256 % of imports 
World War II 1939 – 1945 UK, Germany, 
Soviet Union 
USA $ 800 bn  
Vietnam War 1956 – 1975 South Vietnam USA $ 150 bn  
Yom-Kippur War 1973 Israel USA 
$ 2.6 bn  
4 % of GDP 
20 % of imports 
 
Note: This table shows the scale of official rescue lending in selected severe wars and military conflicts of the 
past 200 years. The size of official assistance is given in real 2015 US Dollars. Whenever data availability 
















(in real 2015 USD and as % of 
recipient GDP or imports) 
Panic of 1825 1825 United Kingdom France 
$ 45 mn 
0.1 % of GDP 
1% of imports 
Banking Crisis 1846 France United Kingdom 
$ 290 mn  
0.6 % of GDP 
6 % of imports 
World Economic 
Crisis 
1857 Hamburg Austria 
$ 150 mn 
2 % of imports 
Baring Crisis 1890 United Kingdom France, Russia 
$ 575 mn 
0.2 % of GDP 
1 % of imports 
Panic of 1907 1907 United Kingdom France 
$ 390 mn 
0.1 % of GDP 
0.5 % of imports 
Post WWI 
Stabilization 
1919 – 1923 Austria UK, France, 
League of Nations 
$ 5.7 bn 
22 % of GDP 




Consortium of 16 
Central Banks 
$ 1 bn 
0.5 % of GDP 
7.2 % of imports 
Crisis of 1931 1931 Germany 
France, UK, USA, 
BIS 
$ 8 bn  
2 % of GDP 
20 % of imports 
Crisis of 1931 1931 United Kingdom France, USA 
$ 19 bn  
4 % of GDP 
24 % of imports 
Currency & debt 
crisis 
1934 – 1937 Brazil USA 
$ 1.5 bn  
2 % of GDP 
50 % of imports 
Dollar Gap & 
Reconstruction of 
Europe 
1946 – 1952 Western Europe USA $ 280 bn  
- 





$ 2.7 bn 
4 % of GDP 
94 % of imports 
Defense of 
Sterling 
1964 United Kingdom IMF, BIS, G-10 
$ 30 bn 
5 % of GDP 
30 % of imports 
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First Oil Crisis 1974 – 1976 Italy IMF, EEC, 
Germany 
$ 23 bn 
3 % of GDP 




1982 – 1983 Brazil IMF, IBRD, IADB, 
Germany, USA 
$ 33 bn 
5 % of GDP 
50 % of imports 
Tequila Crisis 1994 – 1995 Mexico IMF, USA 
$ 76 bn 
10 % of GDP 
68 % of imports 
Asian Crisis 1997 Thailand IMF, Korea, Japan 
$ 18 bn 
7 % of GDP 
16 % of imports 
Great Financial 
Crisis 
2008 – 2010 Ukraine IMF, EU, USA 
$ 50 bn  
31 % of GDP 
65 % of imports 
Eurozone Debt 
Crisis 
2010 - 2015 Greece Eurozone, IMF 
$ 475 bn  
144 % of GDP 
550 % of imports  
 
Note: This table shows selected official rescue packages during financial crises of the past 200 years. The 
size of official assistance is given in real 2015 US Dollars. Whenever data availability permits, we further 
show the magnitude of assistance in percent of pre-disaster recipient country GDP and imports. 
 
One insight from the case narratives is that international official assistance following disasters 
was rare historically, in fact, so rare that we lowered the bar and also show some cases in which total 
population losses were lower than 0.1% of the population (these cases are not included in the 
regression analysis below). Among the few notable historical cases are US aid flows after the Caracas 
earthquake of 1812 and international aid to the Caribbean in response to the 1843 volcano eruption on 
Guadeloupe. Moreover, the committed amounts in the context of natural disasters were typically low, 
not just by modern standards but also in comparison to the sizeable official lending during wars of the 
same era. Over time, the amounts grow and in the recent decades there are a few cases in which 
natural disasters triggered large-scale official aid flows, e.g. Ethiopia’s famines in the mid-1980s, the 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004 or the earthquake in Haiti of 2010. 
Generally, the cases illustrate that the amounts of official lending have increased over time, 
both in absolute terms and as percent of recipient GDP or imports. This is particularly true for 
international bailouts in financial crises. Notable examples include the Sterling Crisis of 1964 in which 
the UK received USD 30 billion (5% of GDP), the Tequila Crisis of 1994/95 in which Mexico 
received USD 76 billion (10% of GDP), as well as the recent bailouts of Ukraine after 2008 (50 billion 
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USD, or 31% of GDP) and Greece after 2010 (Greece received a whopping 475 billion USD in 
bailouts, corresponding to 144 % of Greek GDP, see Reinhart and Trebesch 2015). 
We continue our analysis with a more systematic analysis on the incidence of international 
rescue lending during disasters, focusing on the overlap between the two. Figure 12 shows the share of 
independent countries that experienced disasters (black line) as well as the subset of these countries 
that received international official assistance at the same time (grey shaded areas). The figure 
considers financial crisis, natural catastrophes and military conflict as defined above. 
Figure 12. Incidence of official rescue lending in disasters (all types, 1800-2015) 
 
Note: This figure shows the share of independent countries that experience a disaster (black solid line), 
as well as the subset of these countries that also receive international official assistance (grey shaded 
area). 
 
The main take away from Figure 12 is that official international lending in disasters has 
become much more prevalent and systematic over the course of the past 200 years. Since the interwar 
period, an ever-larger share of crisis countries received foreign financial support. Since World War II 
the share of recipients has almost reached a hundred percent, with only very few countries entering 
crises without receiving any foreign financial help. Institutionally, this trend reflects the emergence of 
a multi-layered financial safety net for sovereigns that provides ready-to-use access to a large array of 
standing financing and risk-sharing options. Figure 13 goes a step further and explores the incidence 
of rescue lending by type of disaster. It shows that the trend towards more systematic international 
rescues is visible for all disaster types. 
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Figure 13. Incidence of rescue lending by type of disaster (1800-2015) 
 
Note: This figure shows the share of independent countries that experience a disaster (black solid line), as well 
as the subset of these countries that also receive international official assistance (grey shaded area). The panels 
differentiate between disaster events: all financial crises (A), debt crises (B), natural disasters (C) and wars (D). 
 
5. Determinants of rescue lending: Why do governments extend cross-border official 
loans? 
Why do governments extend cross-border official loans? According to recent theoretical 
contributions by Tirole (2015), Farhi and Tirole (2018) and Gourinchas, Martin and Messer (2019), a 
main driver of official rescue lending is the concern about cross-border spillovers. In case of two 
closely integrated countries, a creditor government has an incentive to assist the country in crisis so as 
to limit the collateral damage to their own economy. In this view, the rescuer country’s solidarity is 
largely a function of economic self-interest, aimed at reducing the negative externalities stemming 
from the crisis country. The larger this externality is expected to be, the higher the likelihood and 
volumes of rescue lending. The intensity of trade and banking linkages should thus help to predict why 
some governments are willing to assist a crisis country on a large scale, while others choose to abstain.  
 Here, we bring this theoretical prior to the data. The main hypothesis is that the size of 
bilateral lending during financial crises increases in the scale of economic and/or financial integration 
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between creditor and crisis country. To test this hypothesis, we use our newly assembled bilateral 
sovereign lending database, which allows us to estimate the determinants of official lending between 
countries across 200 years. Specifically, we combine our dataset on official bilateral loans with the 
above described disaster events, focusing on loans extended during the first two years of a war, a 
major natural disaster, or of banking, sovereign debt and currency crises.4  
 Figure 14 illustrates the dyadic structure of the bilateral lending data. The width of the red 
connecting lines represents the number of bilateral rescue loans during financial crisis events, wars and 
natural disasters since 1800. The graph shows a wide-spanning global network of bilateral financial 
assistance with the United States and Western Europe being the main creditors. 
Figure 14. Bilateral rescue loans in financial crises, wars and natural disasters 1800 to 2015 
 
 
Note: The width of the red lines increases with the number of bilateral rescue loans. Data on bilateral official 
lending is from our international official lending database (see Section 2 and Appendix III). Data on the 
incidence of financial crises, wars, and disasters is compiled from various sources (see Section 4.1).   
 
5.1 Drivers of bilateral rescue lending - descriptives 
In this section we take a preliminary look at the data. We first introduce the key explanatory 
variables of interest and then examine their correlation with official rescue lending during crises. 
To capture the degree of economic and financial interdependence between two countries, we 
consider two measures. First, bilateral trade exposure, defined as bilateral trade (exports plus imports) 
 
4 This two-year focus is in line with the crisis literature (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998). The results are similar 
when considering only loans in the first crisis year or if we use the first three years. 
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between a creditor and a crisis country, computed as a share of total trade of the creditor economy with 
the rest of the world. This measure captures the weight of the crisis economy in total external trade of 
the potential creditor economy. Long-run bilateral trade data comes from the comprehensive 
TRADHIST project, with bilateral import and export data going back to the early 19th century 
(Fouquin and Hugot, 2016). Second, to capture bilateral financial linkages, we use the BIS 
International Banking Statistics, which is available from 1984. We calculate bilateral financial 
exposure analogously to bilateral trade exposure, meaning that we use the bank loan exposure of a 
potential creditor country towards the crisis country divided by the total bank exposure of the creditor 
country to the rest of the world. This variable captures the relative importance of the crisis country for 
the banking and financial sector of the potential creditor country. 
Figure 15. Correlates of bilateral lending during disasters– trade and bank linkages  
 
Note: The lines show the fitted values from a regression of log bilateral commitments on the relevant 
explanatory variable (the corresponding beta coefficient is shown separately). Data on bilateral rescue lending is 
from the international official lending database (see Section 2 and Appendix III), data on trade and banking 
exposure is from TRADEHIST (back to 1830) and BIS (back to 1984), respectively.  
 
  Figure 15 shows scatter plots of banking and trade exposure between creditor and crisis 
country with the bilateral loan commitment amount granted by creditor countries in disasters (in 
constant 2015 US dollars). Each scatter point represents a bilateral loan commitment during disasters 
since 1830. For illustration, we use natural logarithms. Furthermore, to reduce reverse causality 
problems, we use pre-crisis trade and banking exposure. Figure 15 also shows fitted values and beta 
coefficients from a univariate regression of bilateral rescue lending amounts on trade and banking 
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exposure, respectively. The figure clearly shows that higher creditor country trade or private financial 
exposure is associated with higher bilateral commitments in a disaster event. 
In addition to financial and economic exposure, we also consider the political allegiance 
between country pairs. Governments may be more inclined to rescue lending, if the crisis country is 
politically aligned. We measure this political alignment by the overlap in UN voting behavior between 
pairs of states, a widely used measure that is available post-WW2 (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 
2017).  
Following the literature on international trade, we also consider measures of geographic and 
cultural proximity. We expect the likelihood of cross-border financial assistance to be higher among 
countries of the same region and those that share cultural and political origins. This builds on the idea 
that cultural and geographic proximity can help to overcome enforcement problems and information 
asymmetries (see e.g. Tirole 2015 or Abraham, Caceles-Poveda, Liu and Marimon 2019). Specifically, 
we use a measure of geographic distance as well as dummy variables of a shared religion, a shared 
language and a shared colonial history (from Fouquin and Hugot 2016).  
Figure 16. Correlates of bilateral lending in disasters – geographic and political proximity 
 
Note: The lines show the fitted values from a regression of log bilateral commitments on the relevant 
explanatory variable (the corresponding beta coefficient is shown separately). Data on bilateral rescue lending is 
from the international official lending database (see Section 2 and Appendix II), data on UN voting and distance 
is from the UN and Fouquin and Hugot (2016), respectively. 
Figure 16 plots the measures of joint UN voting and geographic distance against bilateral 
lending commitments during wars, crises and disasters, again using logs and the pre-disaster values for 
the explanatory variables. As expected, larger geographic distance between a creditor and a crisis 
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country is associated with lower financial commitments in crises (left panel). Moreover, we find a 
(weak) negative correlation between UN voting similarity and bilateral rescue lending (right panel).  
5.2. A gravity model of bilateral rescue lending 
In this section, we move beyond correlations and estimate an augmented gravity model of 
bilateral rescue lending. Gravity models posit that bilateral trade between two countries is proportional 
to their economic size and inversely related to their geographic distance (Head and Mayer, 2014). 
They are a workhorse models of international trade, but have also been found to have high explanatory 
power for the geography of private international capital flows (e.g. Portes and Rey 2005 and 
Niepmann 2015). Building on this literature, we apply a gravity model for the context of bilateral 
official flows. The model takes the following form:  ln(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)= β ln  (𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ) + 𝛾 ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛿 ln(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)+ 𝜃′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,  
where subscript i refers to the crisis (debtor) country, j denotes a potential creditor country and t is the 
disaster episode. The dependent variable, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, captures the size of official bilateral 
commitments in real US$ received by debtor country i from creditor country j in crisis episode t. More 
specifically, we include all bilateral official loan commitments extended in the first two years of major 
wars, natural disasters and financial crises since 1830, as discussed in Section 4.1 and Appendix I.  
As explanatory variables, we build on the above cited theory work and include measures of 
the creditor country’s economic and financial exposure to the crisis country. Since bank and trade 
exposure are very highly correlated we include these variable separately to avoid issues of 
multicollinearity. In the baseline regressions we use bilateral trade exposure, because the data goes 
back to the early 19th century, while bilateral bank linkages from the BIS are available only since the 
1980s. As discussed above, we also include geographic distance to the crisis country, similarity in UN 
voting as well as variables for cultural proximity through joint language, joint religion and a shared 
colonial history. Since these measures of cultural proximity are highly correlated, we only include a 
dummy for a shared colonial history in our benchmark regressions, but the results do not significantly 
change, if other measures are used. We also include debtor and creditor fixed effects to account for 
time-invariant creditor or debtor characteristics and episode fixed effects. These episode fixed effects 
are disaster-specific, so as to control for time-specific disaster characteristics such as crisis severity. 
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For the estimation, we closely follow the established literature and examine both the extensive 
and intensive margin, which in our case is the occurrence and size of bilateral official rescue lending, 
respectively. Under heteroscedasticity, OLS estimates of log-linearized models are known to be 
biased. Furthermore, the large number of zeros in the dependent variable leads to a truncated sample 
under log-transformation (Head and Mayer, 2014). A common solution is to employ a Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator that has the desirable properties of being consistent under 
heteroskedastic error terms and that naturally incorporates zero observations (Head and Meyer, 2014). 
PPML can be used to estimate the parameters of a constant elasticity model in its multiplicative form 
and thus avoids the dropping of zeros. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) further show that the PPML 
estimator leads to the same set of first-order conditions as an efficient and consistent non-linear least 
square estimator. For the PPML estimator to be consistent and efficient, it is therefore not necessary 
for the data generating process to follow a Poisson likelihood function. 
Against this backdrop, our main approach is to estimate Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
models, in order to account for heteroscedasticity and to avoid truncation of the sample. For 
completeness, we also show results using a simple binary model, in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes the value of one, if a creditor country extends a rescue loan to the crisis country and 
that is zero otherwise. Moreover, we run OLS to estimate the log-linearized model with log bilateral 
commitments as the dependent variable, even though we are aware that this will result in a truncated 
sample with the above-mentioned bias due to heteroscedasticity. In all three models, robust standard 
errors are used, clustered at the creditor-debtor dyad level.  
Table 5 shows the results of the PPML regressions for the full sample as well as for sub-
samples in different eras of the international financial system. In line with our main hypothesis, 
bilateral economic and financial exposure is significantly correlated with bilateral rescue lending 
across all subsamples, both when using measures of trade and banking linkages. The same is true for 
political allegiances (UN voting similarity, post-WW2) and for the importance of a shared colonial 
history. We also find that geographic distance is a statistically significant predictor of bilateral rescue 
lending. It enters all regressions models with a negative coefficient and thus suggests that 
informational asymmetries and enforcement issues play an important role in impeding official 






Table 5: Gravity models of bilateral rescue lending: Full sample (1830-2015) and by era 
 
Note: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regressions using gross bilateral commitments during crises, wars 
and disasters as dependent variable (in real USD.) All explanatory variables enter as pre-crisis values. The 
models include creditor, debtor and disaster fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the creditor-
debtor dyad. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. See Table A2 in the 
Appendix for a list of included countries. 
Table 6 confirms the main results by focusing on the post-WW2 sample and comparing the 
PPML estimation results with those of OLS and Probit models. In all three columns, bilateral trade 
exposure emerges as a key predictor of official rescue lending during crisis and disasters, both in terms 
of statistical significance and in terms of coefficient size. At the extensive margin (probit model), an 
increase in bilateral trade exposure is associated with a statistically significant increase in the 
likelihood of a rescue loan. In the OLS model, an increase in trade exposure by one percent is reflected 
in a 0.40 percent increase in real commitment amounts. And finally, in the PPML model that captures 
both the intensive as well as the extensive margin, the estimated elasticity of rescue lending to bilateral 
trade exposure is 0.43 and statistically significant. The different models also show similar results with 
respect to distance, shared culture, and political allegiance (UN general assembly voting). 
Full Sample Pre-WWII Bretton Woods Modern Era Modern Era 
1830 - 2015 1830 - 1945 1946 - 1973 1973 - 2015 1984 - 2015
(trade linkages) (banking linkages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade exposure 0.34*** 0.99* 0.32** 0.50***
(0.10) (0.54) (0.15) (0.12)
Financial exposure 0.26***
(0.06)
Distance -0.35** -0.95** -0.63** -0.30* -0.55***
(0.15) (0.48) (0.28) (0.18) (0.17)
UN voting 6.60*** 2.54** 5.44**
(1.45) (1.25) (2.41)
(Former) colony 1.12*** 1.37*** 1.53*** 0.69*** 1.18***
(0.29) (0.46) (0.34) (0.26) (0.22)
Constant 9.67*** 7.10 8.25*** 0.67 -0.43
(1.26) (4.63) (2.65) (1.53) (1.92)
Observations 15429 449 1736 12042 1283
R-squared 0.825 0.997 0.921 0.730 0.961
Creditor FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Debtor FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Episode FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Dep. variable: Bilateral rescue lending
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Table 6. Gravity models of bilateral rescue lending: Different econometric models 
 
Note: The dependent variable in the probit model is a dummy variable indicating the provision of a bilateral 
rescue loan, the dependent variables in the OLS and PPML model are log real bilateral commitments. All 
explanatory variables enter as pre-crisis values. All three models include creditor, debtor and episode fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the creditor-debtor dyad. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. See appendix table A2 for a list of included countries. 
 
Taken together, our results reveal persistent patterns of financial rescue lending during 
disasters. The statistical significance and quantitative importance of bilateral trade and financial 
exposure suggests that official flows follow private flows. Countries seem to be most willing to 
cooperate financially, when private agents have significant “skin in the game” in the form of real 
economic or financial exposure to the crisis country. This finding points towards a substantial element 
of economic self-interest in financial cooperation across all eras of the international financial system. 
Cooperation is most likely to emerge during contagious crises and between closely integrated 
economies. A less charitable restatement is that smaller and poorer countries with more limited 
spillover potential across borders are likely to receive less official finance even if their disasters are 
just as severe. 
Probit OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3)
Trade exposure 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.43***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.10)
Distance -0.13* -0.46*** -0.29*
(0.07) (0.13) (0.15)
UN voting -0.34 1.59*** 3.77***
(0.41) (0.57) (0.71)
Former colony 0.35*** 1.67*** 0.92***
(0.13) (0.21) (0.20)
Constant 3.08** -0.99 6.64***
(1.30) (1.23) (1.17)
Observations 13778 3639 13778
R-squared 0.600 0.742
Creditor FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Debtor FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Episode FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Dep. variable: Bilateral rescue lending
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At the same time, cooperation seems to be impeded by informational asymmetries, as the 
likelihood of rescue lending decreases significantly with higher geographic and cultural distance. 
Besides economic exposure, political allegiance can help in overcoming these frictions.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper quantifies and studies the scope and determinants of official, sovereign-to-
sovereign lending over the past two centuries, based on an encompassing new database. We show that 
cross-border official lending has been an important force in international finance both in the previous 
two centuries and today. Official lending tends to spike during wars and severe financial crises with 
the most notable episodes in World Wars 1 and 2, under Bretton Woods and in the 1930s Depression.  
Official cross-border loans and bailouts have also become much more institutionalized. 
Dozens of new official creditor institutions have been created since the 1970s, including, regional 
development banks. At the same time, bilateral and multilateral institutions lending continue to play an 
important role while central banks have become much more active again in lending to their 
counterparts across borders. Few, if any, major military conflicts, systemic financial crises, or natural 
disasters pass without some form of international official rescue lending.  
In the past two decades, official overseas lending has returned with force, with China joining 
advanced country governments as an active official lender. The size of the post-2008 crisis 
international bailout packages of Greece, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal set records (relative to the 
recipient’s GDP or IMF quotas).  In its early stages still, official lending during the Covid-19 crisis has 
already skyrocketed both in the form of various emergency facilities at the IMF and World Bank and 
swap lines from the Federal Reserve, a replay of the global financial crisis of 2008.  
A further key insight from our analysis is that official lending increases with the degree of 
economic integration. Standard gravity models suggest that economies that are closely interlinked are 
also more likely to cooperate financially when adversity strikes.  At a more general level, the rise in 
globalization of recent decades occurs alongside a rise in official cross-border finance. 
While their character may morph over time, we conclude that official capital flows will remain 
a central element of the international financial system for decades to come. Against this background, 
more work is needed to analyze the features of official lending around the world, as well as its 
determinants and consequences. On determinants, our analysis represents a first step to understand 
why sovereign nations lend to each other. There are many questions more for future research. What 
are geopolitical drivers of official lending? What is the role of central bank cross-border lending in 
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crisis management and resolution? Should official loans and bailout packages be extended via 
bilateral, regional or rather multilateral institutions? Also some of the questions addressed in an older 
literature may warrant revisiting: What are the spillovers between official and private capital flows? 
What are the effects of policy conditionality that is so often attached to official loans? No doubt the 
unfolding Covid-19 pandemic will raise a whole new set of questions on the design and efficacy of 
new crisis lending facilities and official debt relief efforts. 
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Appendix I.  Dating disasters since 1800 
Our dataset covers financial crises, military conflicts, and severe natural disasters since 1800. This 
appendix describes the relevant definitions and data sources. 
1. Banking, currency and external sovereign debt crises 
Our definition of external financial crisis events follows Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). A currency crisis 
is defined as an annual depreciation against the relevant anchor currency by 15 percent or more. A 
banking crisis is defined by events: the occurrence of bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or 
take-over of one or more financial institutions, or, in the absence of runs, the closure, merging, take-
over, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution that marks the start of 
similar outcomes for other financial institutions. Only systemic (severe) banking crises are included. 
Finally, an external sovereign debt crisis is defined as the failure of a government to meet a principal 
or interest payment towards a foreign creditor on the due date.  
Determining the duration of a banking crisis is particularly challenging, while dating the start of a 
banking crisis tends to be easier to discern due to the occurrence of a specific crisis event such as a 
bank run or intervention, as described. External sovereign debt crises are generally considered to end 
once final resolution is reached with external creditors (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Figure A1 builds 
on these definitions and presents the incidence of banking, currency and sovereign debt crises since 
1800 by showing the number of countries that experience a currency or banking crisis or are in default 
(restructuring) on external creditors.  
Since many years and even decades can pass before a country in default reaches a final agreement with 
external creditors, sovereign defaults can give rise to very long debt crises spells. Similarly, currency 
crashes can accompany chronically high inflation spells for years. Hence, we limit our focus to new 
default episodes, i.e. the year, in which a country enters a crisis by defaulting on external debt. We use 
the same approach to date the first year of a currency crash or systemic banking crisis. Figure A2 




Figure A1. Varieties of financial crises 
Incidence of banking, currency and external sovereign debt crises 1800 - 2015 
 
Figure A2. Incidence of new banking, currency and external sovereign debt crises 1800 - 2015 
 
Note: It is common for countries to experience different “varieties” of financial crises in the same year. Data is 




2. Military conflict 
Our dating of wars relies on the Correlates of War project, which defines a war as sustained combat, 
involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1000 battle-related fatalities over the 
course of a 12 months period (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The Correlates of War data collection 
further distinguishes inter-state and intra-state conflict: International or inter-state conflicts are defined 
as wars between two or more territorial states that are members of the international state system. To 
the contrary, intra-state (or civil) wars are defined by sustained military combat within a state and with 
active participation of the national government. In the CoW database, war begins with the onset of 
sustained military combat and ends with the cessation of sustained military combat. Formal 
declarations of war and armistice agreements are only used as the beginning and end dates of war if 
they coincide with the beginning and end of military combat. 
Data on inter and intra-state military conflicts is available from the Correlates of War Project since 
1816 and until 2010. As the coding of inter- and intra-state military conflicts does not cover the early 
19th century and in particular the Napoleonic Wars, we extend coverage back to 1800. Since data on 
combat and battle-related fatalities is not readily available, we create a simple dummy variable that 
indicates formal declarations of war during the Napoleonic and French Revolutionary Wars. To do so, 
we use the following sources: 
Esdaile, Charles. 2007. Napoleon’s Wars: An international history, 1803 – 1815. Penguin: London.  
Fermont-Barnes, Gregory. 2006. The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars: A Political, Social and Military History. ABC Clio: Santa Barbara. 
Gibler, Douglas. 2008. International Military Alliances 1648 – 2008. CQ Press: Washington DC. 
 
Figure A3 shows the number of countries involved in inter- and intra-state military conflicts in each 





Figure A3. Incidence of military conflicts 1800 - 2010 
 
Note: See text for definition and sources. 
 
3. Natural disasters 
The key building block of this data is the EM-DAT International Disaster Database that provides 
information on the occurrence, material damage and fatalities of several thousand disasters since 1900. 
The EM-DAT database includes data on a variety of disastrous events: geophysical (earthquakes and 
volcano eruptions), meteorological (extreme temperatures and storms), hydrological (floods and 
landslides), climatological (droughts, famines and wildfires) and biological such as epidemics. 
Extending the coverage to the 19th century poses a variety of challenges given that coverage falls far 
short of modern standards. Our primary source for the years from 1800 to 1900 is the US National 
Center for Environmental Information that offers data on the occurrence of earthquakes, volcano 
eruptions, floods, tsunamis and storms. In ongoing data collection, we supplement this data with 
sources that document the incidence of famines and epidemics in the 19th century. These include: 
Alfani, Guido, and Cormac Ó Gráda. 2018. The timing and causes of famines in Europe. Nature 
Sustainability 1: 283-288. 
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Alfani, Guido, and Cormac Ó Gráda, eds. 2017. Famine in European History. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
De Waal, Alex. 2018. Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famines. Polity Press: Cambridge 
MA. 
Hays, J. 2005. Epidemics and Pandemics: Their Impact on Human History. ABC Clio: Santa Barbara. 
Hays, J. 2009. The Burdens of Disease: Epidemics and Human Responses in Western History. Rutgers 
University Press: New Brunswick NJ.  
O’Grada, Garcia. 2009. Famine: A Short History. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
Figure A4 presents the incidence of natural disasters and the associated fatalities since 1800. 
Casualties from natural disasters are dominated by major famines such as Europe’s year without a 
summer in 1816, the Great Irish Potato Famine in the late 1840s or the famines associated with 
China’s Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. The number of identified disaster events shows a 
pronounced increase particularly after World War II. Rather than reflecting structural trends in the 
frequency of disasters, this shift is driven by the improvement in coverage and reporting; the time 
series underscore that our log of disaster events in the 19th and early 20th century is far from complete. 
However, as we are primarily interested in severe natural disasters that may warrant international 
assistance, incomplete coverage during the 19th century is not a major concern. In effect, it raises the 
issue that for the post-WW2 era we need to restrict the log to the more severe disasters. To winnow the 
event log, we match our list of natural disasters with population data from Mitchell (2013) and restrict 
our coverage to those natural disasters where the loss of life is at least 0.1 percent of the population of 
the affected country. This filter yields 108 severe natural disasters over the course of the past 200+ 
years.  
While the timing of a natural disaster is straight-forward in the cases of earthquakes, floods or 
hurricanes, it is more challenging to accurately date the duration of famines and epidemics. For these 
cases, we follow the same approach as we do for financial crises and focus on the initial epidemic or 







Figure A4. Incidence of natural disasters 1800 - 2015 
  





Appendix II. Country sample for regression analysis  
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Appendix III. Construction of the International Official Lending database 
 
Definition of official sovereign lending: Our database provides data on official loans, grants and 
guarantees by bilateral and multilateral official creditors since 1790. Note that we do not attempt to 
cover official transfers resulting from indemnity and reparation payments. While reparation payments 
have been sizable at different points of history, we do not include them in our dataset, as they are not 
based on the same consensual legal basis as credits, grants and guarantees.  
 
Our database is spliced together from hundreds of different sources that fall into four main categories: 
(i) International Treaties and Financial Agreements; (ii) Reports and budget plans of creditor and 
debtor institutions, both published and from archives; (iii) Information on official lending collected by 
international organizations, most importantly the Debtor Reporting System (DRS) of the World Bank 
and the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC); 
(iv) Information on official lending collected by modern and historic academic research. 
 
In the following, we list the sources used to construct the database and structure them by the four main 
eras covered: (i) The long 19th century (1790 to WW1),  (ii) the Inter-War Period, (iii) the post-World 
War II and Bretton Woods era and (iv) the modern era (1970 - 2015), for which data is more readily 
available from international organizations. Additional creditor-specific sources that have been used for 
more than one historic era are listed separately by creditor country and organization (v).  
1. The Long 19th Century: 1790 - 1914  
Our dataset for the 19th century is mainly based on international treaty series. We search all available 
treaty collections for bilateral credit and subsidy agreements and code all available information on 
these financial transactions. The resulting dataset therefore consists of loan-level information on loans, 
grants and guarantees extended by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Austria-
Hungary as well as various smaller states. We supplement this series with information from investor 
manuals and statistical year books as well as dozens of country specific resources, in particular budget 
plans and national accounts. For lending by central banks, we have made use of existing research on 
central bank cooperation during the 19th century and on archival research at the Bank of England and 






General Treaty Series 
 
Bevans, Charles. Various Years. Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of 
America. Washington D.C.: Department of State. 
De Martens, Georg Frederic. Various Years. Recueil Des Principaux Traites d'Alliance, de Paix, de 
Treve, de  Neutralite, de Commerce, de Limites, d'Echange et des plusieurs autres actes 
servant a la connaissance des relations etranges des puissances et etats de l'Europe.  
Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
De Martens, Georg Frederic, and de Martens, Charles. Various Years. Recueil Des Principaux Traites 
d'Alliance, de Paix, de Treve, de Neutralite, de Commerce, de Limites, d'Echange et des 
plusieurs autres actes servant a la connaissance des relations etranges des puissances et 
etats de l'Europe. Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
De Martens, Georg Frederic, and Saalfeld, Frederic. Various Years. Recueil Des Principaux Traites 
d'Alliance, de Paix, de Treve, de Neutralite, de Commerce, de Limites, d'Echange et des 
plusieurs autres actes servant a la connaissance des relations etranges des puissances et 
etats de l'Europe. Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
De Martens, Georg Frederic, and Murhard, Frederic. Various Years. Recueil Des Principaux Traites 
d'Alliance, de Paix, de Treve, de Neutralite, de Commerce, de Limites, d'Echange et des 
plusieurs autres actes servant a la connaissance des relations etranges des puissances et 
etats de l'Europe. Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
Hopf, Jules. Various Years. Noveau Recueil Generals Des Traites et Autres Actes Relatifs aux Rapport 
de Droit International. Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
Murhard, Frederic. Various Years. Noveau Recueil Generals Des Principaux Traites, Conventions et 
Autres Transactions Remarquables. Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
Samwer, Charles, and Hopf, Jules. Various Years. Noveau Recueil Generals Des Traites et Autres 
Actes Relatifs aux Rapport de Droit International. Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
Samwer, Charles. Various Years. Noveau Recueil Generals Des Principaux Traites, Conventions et 
Autres Transactions Remarquable. Gottingue: Libraire de Dieterich. 
Stoerk, Felix. Various Years. Noveau Recueil Generals Des Traites et Autres Actes Relatifs aux 
Rapport de Droit International. Leipzig: Libraire Dieterich. 
Triepel, Heinrich. Various Years. Noveau Recueil Generals Des Traites et Autres Actes Relatifs aux 
Rapport de Droit International. Leipzig: Libraire Dieterich. 
De Martens, Georg Frederic. Various Years. Recueil des Traites et Conventions conclus par la Russie 
avec les Puissances Etrangeres. St. Petersburg: Imprimerie du Ministere des vois de 
communication. 
De Clercq, M. Jules. Various Years. Recueil des Traites de la France. Paris: Archives Diplomatiques. 
United Kingdom Foreign Office. Various Years. British and Foreign State Papers. London: Her 
Majesty's Stationary Office. 
 
Annual Reports and Statistical Compendia 
Clarke, Hyde. 1878. Sovereign and Quasi Sovereign States: Their Debts to Foreign Countries. Journal 
of the Statistical Society 51 (2): 299 - 347. 
Fenn, Charles. Various years. Fenn's compendium of the English and foreign funds, debts and 
revenues of all nation. London: E. Wilson.  
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Fortune, Thomas. Various years. Fortune's Epitome of the Stock and Public Funds. London: Boosey & 
Sons.  
Kimber, Albert. 1922. Kimber's Records of Government Debts and other Foreign Securities. New 
York: A. W. Kimber & Company. 
Secondary sources 
Ahrens, Gerhard. 1986. Krisenmanagement 1857 - Staat Und Kaufmannschaft in Hamburg Während 
Der Ersten Weltwirtschaftskrise. Hamburg: Verein für Hamburgische Geschichte. 
Bordo, Michael D, and Anna J Schwartz. 1999. Under What Circumstances, Past and Present, Have 
International Rescues of Countries in Financial Distress Been Successful? Journal of 
International Money and Finance 18 (4): 683 - 708.  
Esteves, Rui, and Ali Tuncer. 2014. Feeling the Blues. Moral Hazard and Debt Dilution in Eurobonds 
Before 1914. CEPR Discussion Paper 9860. 
Flandreau, Marc. 1997. Central bank Cooperation in Historical Perspective : A Sceptical View. The 
Economic History Review 50 (4): 735-63.  
Kindleberger, Charles. 1984. A Financial History of Western Europe. London: Routledge. 
Mitchener, Kris J. and Marc Weidenmier. 2010. Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 29 (1): 19 - 36. 
 
2. World Wars I and II and the Interwar Period: 1914 - 1945  
 
Official lending surged with the onset of World War I and its immediate aftermath. Debts owed to 
official creditors remained high throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This phenomenon was documented 
in policy reports by official institutions, in investor manuals and in the writings of contemporaneous 
observers. Our time-series splices together all these sources and supplements them with credit 
agreements from international treaty series and creditor country budget plans. For central banks we 
again make use of annual reports, existing academic work and archival research. 
Treaty Series, Annual Reports and Statistical Compendia  
 
Bank for International Settlements. Various Years. Annual Report. Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements. 
League of Nations. 1936. Enquiry into Clearing Agreements. Geneva: League of Nations.  
League of Nations. 1943. Relief Deliveries and Relief Loans 1919-1923. Geneva: League of Nations. 
League of Nations. Various Years. League of Nations Treaty Series. Geneva: League of Nations. 
League of Nations. 1943. Europe's Capital Movements 1919-1932: A Statistical Note. Geneva: League 
of Nations. 
Moody's. Various Years. Moody's Manual of Investments - American and Foreign. New York: 
Moody’s Investor Service. 
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United Nations. 1946. International Capital Movement during the Inter-War Period. United Nations 






Andersen, Poul N. 1946. Bilateral Exchange Clearing Policy. London: Oxford University Press. 
Clarke, Stephen. 1967. Central bank Cooperation 1924-1931. New York: Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. 
Eichengreen, Barry. 1992. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919 - 1939. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Fisk, Harvey. 1924. The Inter-Ally Debts 1914 - 1923. New York: Bankers Trust Company. 
Flores Zendejas, Juan, and Yann Decorzant. 2016. Going Multilateral? Financial Markets' Access and 
the League of Nations Loans, 1923 – 1928. Economic History Review 2: 653–78.  
Gordon, Margaret. 1941. Barriers to World Trade. New York: MacMillan. 
Margold, Stella. 1934. Export Credit Insurance in Europe today. Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office. 
Meyer, Richard Hemming. 1970. Bankers' Diplomacy - Monetary Stabilization in the Twenties. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Moulton, Harold G., and Leo Pasvolsky. 1932. War Debts and World Prosperity. Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution. 
Myers, Margaret. 1945. The League Loans. Political Science Quarterly 60 (4): 492–526. 
Neal, Larry. 1979. The Economics and Finance of Bilateral Clearing Agreements: Germany, 1934-8. 
The Economic History Review 32 (3): 391-404.  
Reinhart, Carmen, and Christoph Trebesch. 2016. Sovereign Debt Relief and Its Aftermath. Journal of 
the European Economic Association 14 (1): 215-51. 
Ritschl, A O. 2001. Nazi Economic Imperialism and the Exploitation of the Small: Evidence from 
Germany’s Secret Foreign Exchange Balances, 1938-1940. Economic History Review 54 
(2): 324–45.  
Strachan, Hew. 2004. Financing the First World War. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Thomas, Hugh. 1961. The Spanish Civil War. New York: Modern Library. 
 
3. Post World War II and Bretton Woods: 1945 - 1973 
Our collection of post-WW2 loans and grants builds on a large number of published and unpublished 
reports by the BIS, the IBRD, Moody's, the OEEC (renamed to OECD in 1961) and the UN. All of the 
reports listed in the following are available in the on-site or digital archives of these institutions. For 
ongoing data collection on cross-border central bank lending, we make use of the secondary literature 






Andersen, Svend, and James Lynch. 1949. Summary Review of the External Debt of the United 
Kingdom. Report No. E 67A. Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Andersen, Svend, James Lynch, and William Pollock. 1949. The External Debt of Ecuador. Report 
No. E 66. Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Andersen, Svend, Martin Rosen, and Alexander Stevenson. 1947. Possibility of Foreign Lending by 
Countries other than the U.S. in the immediate Future. Report No. ERM 82. Washington 
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Bank for International Settlements. 1945 - 1973. Annual Report. Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Beaufort, Carel de. 1953. Summary of the External Debt of Japan. Report No. EC 14. Washington 
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Beaufort, Carel de. 1953. Summary of the External Debt of West Germany. Report No. EC 18. 
Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Fraser, William. 1951. The History and Present Position of the External Debt of the Dominican 
Republic. Report No. E 137. Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Fraser, William. 1951. The External Debt of the Kingdom of Denmark. Report No. E 147e. 
Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Gaiola, Nicola. 1955. Summary of the External Public Debt of Peru. Report No. EC 46. Washington 
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1950. Public External Debt of the Belgium and Luxembourg. Report No. E 105. 
Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1950.  Preliminary Survey of the External Debt of France. Report No. E 90. 
Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1950. Public External Debt of Ethiopia. Report No. E 107. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1950. Public External Debt of Indonesia. Report No. E 119. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1950. Preliminary Review of The External Debt of Iceland. Report No. E 126. 
Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1950. Public External Debt of Ceylon. Report No. E 129.  Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1950. The External Debt of Costa Rica. Report No. E 130. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1951. Public External Debt of the Belgian Congo. Report No. E 154. Washington 
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1951. Review of the External Debt of Iceland. Report No. E 170. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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Huang, Andrew. 1952. The External Debt of Nicaragua. Report No. E 224. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1952. Summary of the External Debt of Thailand. Report No. EC 1. Washington 
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1952. Public External Debt of Luxembourg. Report No. EC 4. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1954. The Public External Debt of Austria. Report No. EC 26. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1954. The External Debt of Ethiopia. Report No. EC 27. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1954. External Public Debt of Greece. Report No. EC 28. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1954. The Long-Term Public External Debt of Belgium and the Belgian Congo. 
Report No. EC 34. Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1954. The External Public Debt of Luxembourg. Report No. EC 38a. Washington 
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1955. The Long-Term Public External Debt of Belgium and the Belgian Congo. 
Report No. EC 39. Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1956. A Preliminary Review of the External Public Debt of India. Report No. EC 51. 
Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Huang, Andrew. 1956. Public External Debt of Indonesia. Report No. EC 54. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
IBRD. 1955. Summary of the External Public Debt of Norway. Report No. EC 42. Washington D.C.: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
IBRD. 1955. The External Debt of Italy. Report No. EC 44. Washington D.C.: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
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4. Modern Era: 1970 - 2015 
 
From 1970 onwards data on official lending has been systematically collected by international 
organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD. Our database brings together data on official 
grants from the OECD's creditor reporting system (CRS) and data on bilateral loans from the World 
Bank's debtor reporting system (DRS). The latter is not publicly available, but has been obtained from 
the World Bank upon request. For multilateral lending, we make use of several different sources. Aid 
flows by development banks are mostly taken from the project level data published by AidData at 
William & Mary (Tierney et al., 2011). In a few instances, we complement this rich data source with 
additional transaction-level data from annual reports of creditors. Lending by regional financial 
arrangements is taken from creditor organization annual reports and websites as well as from the 
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database provided by Scheubel and Stracca (2016). For central bank lending, our collection of loans 
stems from Central bank annual reports and from existing academic research.  
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than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData. World 
Development 39 (11): 1891-1906. 
World Bank. 2017. Debtor Reporting System: Database. Request for data extract filed at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information.  
 
Main sources on multilateral creditors 
 
Arab Monetary Fund. Various Years. Annual Report. Abu Dhabi. 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 2019. Approved Projects. https://www.aiib. 
org/en/projects/approved/index.html. 
Bank for International Settlements. Various Years. Annual Report. Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. 2019. ``Projects: Dataset``. 
https://efsd.eabr.org/en/projects/. 
European Commission. Various Years. Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Implementation of Macro-Financial Assistance to Third Countries. Brussels. 
European Commission. Various Years. The Commission's Annual Report to the Parliament and the 
Council on the Borrowing and Lending Activities of the Community. Brussels: European 
Commission. 
European Commission. 2019. Balance of Payment (BoP) Assistance. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Union. Various Years. “Official Journal of the European Union.” Brussels. 
European Economic Union. Various Years. Protocols on Financial and Technical Cooperation. 
Brussels: EUR-Lex. 
Commission of the European Communities. Various Years. Annual Report from the Commission on 
the Implementation of Community Assistance to the Countries of East and Central Europe 
(PHARE). Brussels: European Economic Union. 
Commission of the European Communities. Various Years. Agreements and Other Bilateral 
Commitments Linking the Communities with Non-Member Countries. Brussels: European 
Communities. 
Commission of the European Communities. Various Years. Annual Report from the Commission on 
PHARE, Pre-Accession and Transition Instruments. Brussels: European Economic Union. 
Commission of the European Communities. Various Years. General Report on Pre-Accession 
Assistance (PHARE - ISPA - SAPARD). Brussels: European Communities. 
59 
 
European Commission. Various Years. Report from the Commission on Financial Assistance for 
Enlargement (IPA, PHARE, CARDS, Turkey Pre-Accession Instrument, Transition 
Facility). Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission. Various Years. Annual Report on the Implementation of the European 
Commission's External Assistance. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission. Various Years. The TACIS Programme - Annual Report. Brussels: European 
Commission. 
European Commission. 2009. Evaluation of the Council Regulation No 2698/2000 (MEDA II) and its 
Implementation - Final Report. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Investment Bank. 2019. List of Financed Projects. http://www.eib.org/en/ 
projects/loan/list/index.htm. 
European Stability Mechanism. 2019. Financial Assistance.  https://www.esm. europa.eu/financial-
assistance. 
Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas. 2019. Historically Approved Credits. http://flar.net/. 
Inter-American Development Bank. 2019. Statement of Approved Loans. 
https://www.iadb.org/en/idb-finance/statement-approved-loans. 
New Development Bank. 2019. List of all Projects. https://www.ndb.int/projects/ list-of-all-projects/. 
Scheubel, Beatrice, and Livio Stracca. 2016. Occasional Paper Series What Do We Know about the 
Global Financial Safety Net? Rationale, Data and Possible Evolution: Dataset. ECB 
Occasional Paper Series No. 177. 
Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. Nielson, Darren G. Hawkins, J. Timmons Roberts, Michael G. Findley, 
Ryan M. Powers, Bradley Parks, Sven E. Wilson, and Robert L. Hicks. 2011. More Dollars 
than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData. World 




Bederman, David J. 1988. The Bank for International Settlements and the Debt Crisis: A New Role for 
the Central Bankers' Bank? Berkeley Journal of International Law 6(1): 91 - 121. 
James, Harold. 1996. International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
James, Harold. 2012. Making the European Monetary Union. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
5. Country-specific sources 
We cross-check and complement all of the above mentioned references by a large number of creditor-
specific data sources, in particular budget plans and annual reports. We list these sources by creditor 
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6. Coverage of multilateral creditors 
This section provides an overview on the multilateral creditor organizations that are covered in our 
international official lending database as well as the coding sources. The table distinguishes between 
(i) organizations that have global coverage, (ii) stability arrangements that have regional membership 
and specialize in the provision of balance of payments support, and (iii) regional development banks 
that specialize in the provision of development finance to certain groups of countries. Our data 
collection for the BIS and UN agencies is still ongoing. 
 





Global organizations Time coverage Main data sources
Bank for International Settlements 1930 - 2015 BIS Annual Reports
BIS Archive
International Monetary Fund 1944 - 2015 Reinhart & Trebesch (2016)
IMF Annual Reports
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 1947 - 2015 IBRD Statement of Loans
(available online)
International Development Association (IDA) 1961 - 2015 IDA Statement of Loans
(available online)
League of Nations 1920 - 1939 Moody's Investment Manual
Flores and Decorzant (2015)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1979 - 2015 Annual Reports
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 1979 - 2015 Annual Reports
(UNICEF)
United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees 2005 - 2015 Annual Reports
(UNHCR)






Regional Stability Arrangements Time coverage Main data sources
Andean Reserve Fund 1978 - 1989 FLAR Website
FLAR Annual Reports
Arabic Monetary Fund 1977 - 2015 AMF Annual Reports
BRICS Contingent  Reserves Agreement 2014 - 2015 Establishment Treaty
(not activated)
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 2000 - 2009 Central Bank websites
(not activated)
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) 2009 - 2015 Central Bank websites
(not activated)
Eurasian Fund for Stability and Development 2010 - 2015 EFSD Annual Repots
European Payments Union 1950 - 1958 BIS Annual Reports
European Monetary Fund (EMA) 1958 - 1973 BIS Annual Reports
European MTFA Facility 1971 - 1988 Official Journal of the EU
European Community Loan Mechanism 1975 - 1988 Official Journal of the EU
European Balance of Payments Facility 1988 - 2015 Official Journal of the EU
European Financial Stability Mechanism 2010 - 2015 ESM Website
European Financial Stability Facility 2010 - 2015 ESM Website
European Stability Mechanism 2012 - 2015 ESM Website
Latin American Reserve Fund 1989 - 2017 FLAR Website




Development Banks and other regional creditors Time coverage Main data sources
African Development Bank 1967 - 2015 AidData
(AFDB) OECD CRS
African Development Fund 1974 - 2015 AidData
(AFDF) OECD CRS
Andean Development 1988 - 2015 AidData
Corporation (CAD) Annual Reports
Arab Bank for Economic 1975 - 2015 AidData
Development in Africa (BADEA) OECD CRS
Arab Fund for Economic and 1974 - 2015 AidData
Social Development (AFESD) OECD CRS
Asian Development Bank 1968 - 2015 AidData
(AsDB) Annual Reports
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 2015 - 2015 Website
(AIIB)
Caribbean Development Bank 1970 - 2015 AidData
(CDB) Annual Reports
Council of Europe 1958 - 2015 Annual Reports
European Bank of Reconstruction 1991 - 2015 AidData
and Development (EBRD) OECD CRS
Euratom 1958 - 1967 Official Journal of the EEC
Moody's Investor Manual
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 1951 - 1967 Official Journal of the EEC
Moody's Investor Manual
European Development Fund 1973 - 2015 AidData
OECD CRS
European Investment Bank 1959 - 2015 EIB Project History
Website
European Union PHARE 1989 - 2007 Annual Reports
European Union IPA 2007 - 2015 Annual Reports
Inter-American Development 1959 - 2015 AidData
Bank (IADB) Annual Reports
International Fund for 1978 - 2015 AidData




Islamic Development Bank 1976 -2015 AidData
(IsDB) OECD CRS
New Development Bank 2014 - 2015 Website
Nordic Development Fund 1977 - 2015 AidData
OECD CRS
North American Development Bank 1996 - 2015 AidData
Annual Reports
OPEC Fund for International 1976 -2015 AidData
 Development (OFID) OECD CRS
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2005 - 2015 AidData
(OSCE) OECD CRS
